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MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
INTERSTATE RECOGNITION OF MARRIAGE
Bannister v. Bannister1
Plaintiff alleged that he and defendant were married
on March 10, 1935 in California,2 at which time the de-
fendant represented that she had secured, in that state,
a divorce from her former husband. As a matter of record,
defendant had obtained in 1929 an interlocutory 3 decree
of divorce in California from her former spouse. For a
reason or reasons not disclosed a final decree of divorce
was not entered by the California Court until May 27, 1935,
or almost three months after the marriage ceremony en-
tered into by plaintiff and defendant. On March 17, 1942,
the plaintiff, who had meantime moved to Maryland, 4 filed
against his wife a bill of complaint in the Circuit Court for
Anne Arundel County, asking for a decree annulling their
marriage, which he contended was invalid under Maryland
law because it took place before defendant's California
interlocutory decree of divorce from her previous husband
had been made final.5 Finally, on April 4, 1942, or eighteen
days after the bringing of these proceedings, the Cali-
fornia court, acting in pursuance of a California statute6
129 A. (2d) 287 (Md., 1942).
2 Both parties were domiciled in California at the time of the ceremony.
' Under California law then in force defendant could have obtained a
final decree one year after the rendition of the interlocutory decree.
4The pleadings show that plaintiff had resided in Maryland for a period
exceeding one year prior to institution of the suit, and that defendant was
a non-resident of Maryland, having remained in California.
I It appears from the record and briefs that defendant believed she was
absolutely divorced when she married plaintiff and that he, upon learning
of the non-finality of his wife's divorce, ignored advice of his lawyer to
remarry, and chose to rely on the validity of his marriage to defendant.
8 Civil Code of California (1937 Ed.) See. 133, as amended in 1941,.and
reading as follows: "Whenever either of the parties in a divorce action is,
under the law, entitled to a final judgment, but by mistake, negligence or
inadvertence the same has not been signed, filed or entered, if no appeal
has been taken from the interlocutory judgment or motion for a new trial
made, the court, on the motion of either party thereto or upon its own
motion, may cause a final judgment to be signed, dated, filed or entered
therein granting the divorce as of the date when the same could have been
given or made by the court if applied for. The court may cause such final
judgment to be signed, dated, filed and entered nunc pro tunc as aforesaid,
even though a final judgment may have been previously entered where by
mistake, negligence or inadvertence the same has not been signed, filed or
entered as soon as it could have been entered ufider the law if applied for.
Upon the filing of such final judgment, the parties to such action shall be
deemed to have been restored to the status of single persons as of the date
affixed to such judgment, and any marriage of either of such parties subse-
quent to one year after the granting of the interlocutory judgment as
shown by the minutes of the court, and after the final judgment could have
been entered under the law if applied for, shall be valid for all purposes
as of the date affixed to such final judgment, upon the filing thereof."
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passed in 1941, ordered with respect to defendant's 1929
divorce proceeding that the final decree therein "be signed,
dated, filed and entered nunc pro tunc granting the Final
Decree of Divorce as and of the 18th day of October, 1930,
the date when the same could have been given or made
by the court if applied for." Defendant demurred to the
bill of complaint, whereupon plaintiff filed an amended
bill asking (a) that the marriage be declared void ab initio,
and (b) for a divorce a vinculo matrimonii. The lower
court dismissed the amended bill and plaintiff appealed.
Held: Affirmed.
The Court reasoned that marriages are valid everywhere
if valid where made. Thus in this case it was within the
power of the state of California, where not only the mar-
riage in question but also the defendant's first marriage
and her divorce took place, to establish the validity vel non
of the second marriage. That state having provided for
its affirmance, the Maryland Court will recognize the Cali-
fornia marriage as valid.
It has been customary to state as the general rule that
a marriage valid by the law of the state where it was
celebrated will be regarded everywhere as valid.7  The
Maryland Court has indicated willingness to apply this
principles except with respect to marriages which are (a)
incestuous,9 (b) miscegenetic, 1° or (c) polygamous.11
Dependent upon the degree of relationship, incestuous
marriages are viewed in Maryland as either void or void-
able. Brother-sister, parent-child, and grand parent-grand
child unions are so clearly offensive as to make the mar-
riage absolutely void in this state, irrespective of the law
of the place of celebration or of the domicil of the parties. 12
Marriages between uncle and niece or aunt and nephew
Fornshill v. Murray, 1 B1. 479 (1828) ; Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17,
33 A. 317, 34 L. R. A. 773 (1895) ; Fensterwald v. Burk, 129 Md. 131, 98 A.
358, 3 A. L. R. 1562 (1916) ; In re Miller's Estate, 2.39 Mich. 455, 214 N. W.
428 (1928) ; McDonald v. McDonald, 6 Cal. (2d) 457, 58 P. (2d) 163, 104 A.
L. R. 1290 (1936) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) Sec. 121, Mary-
land Annotations (1937) Secs. 121-136; GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d
Ed., 1938) Sec. 113; STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1937) 255, et 8eq. The
following states have adopted by statute the general rule that a marriage
outside the state, valid where contracted, is valid within the state: Cali-
fornia, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota,
South Dakota and Utah. See COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1942) Ch. XVII; also Deak, Conflict of Laws: Recent
Development Concerning Marriage (1929) 27 Mich. L. Rev. 389.
8 See Maryland cases cited 8upra, n. 7.
1 See Md. Code (1939) Art. 62, See. 1.
10 See Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 445.
" Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17, 33 A. 317, 34 L. R. A. 773 (1895) ; Jones
v. Jones, 36 Md. 447, 456-7, 11 Am. Rep. 505 (1872).
12 Jackson v. Jackson, 82 Md. 17, 29, 33 A. 317, 34 L. R. A. 773 (1895).
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are merely voidable. 13 In Fensterwald v. Burk,4 an uncle
and niece, forbidden to marry by Maryland law, journeyed
to Rhode Island where such a marriage was permitted to
persons of the parties' faith, were there married, and then
returned to Maryland. In a suit brought by a nephew
after the uncle's death to have the union declared void,
the Court upheld the Rhode Island marriage. Because
there were present other equally good grounds for reach-
ing the same result the decision cannot be regarded as a
square ruling on the recognition of the validity of a foreign
marriage because valid where made. It nevertheless rep-
resents an instance where the Maryland Court, when con-
fronted with a foreign marriage between two of its citi-
zens, effected in evasion of its law, referred to the "valid
where made-valid everywhere" rule in sustaining the
out-of-state marriage. Willingness to recognize such a for-
eign marriage between its own citizens suggests a greater
readiness to accept as valid a similar union involving non-
citizens.
By statute 6 in Maryland any attempted inter-marriage
of a white person and a Malayan or of either of these with
a negro or person of negro descent to the third generation
is forbidden and declared void. Although miscegenation
has never been dealt with directly by the Maryland Court
of Appeals, there is language (dictum) in Jackson v. Jack-
son' 7 to the effect that a miscegentic marriage would be
treated as absolutely void even though valid where made
and involving non-citizens.'" In the opinion the Court
said:
13 Fensterwald v. Burk, 129 Md. 131, 98 A. 358, 3 A. L. R. 1562 (1916).
14 Supra, n. 13.
11 See Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland and Their
Annulment (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 218, n. 25 where the author points out
that the suit, having been instituted by a third person in an Equity Court
after the death of one spouse (the husband) to have the marriage an-
nulled, could have been dismissed on any one of the following bases: (a) a
third person has no standing to sue to annul a marriage, Ridgely v.
Ridgely, 79 Md. 298, 29 A. 597, 25 L. R. A. 800 (1894) ; (b) the marriage of
uncle and niece, under Maryland law, is voidable only by a proceeding
during the joint lifetime of the spouses, Harrison v. State, Use of Harrison,
22 Md. 468, 85 Am. Dec. 658 (1864) ; or (c) a proceeding to annul a mar-
riage between uncle and niece in Baltimore City may be brought only in
the Superior Court, and not in an Equity Court, Ridgely v. Ridgely, supra
this note.
"o Md. Code (1939) Art. 27, Sec. 445.
17 Supra, n. 12.
18 Accord: State v. Bell, 7 Baxt. (66 Tenn.) 9, 32 Am. Rep. 549 (1872)
State of Georgia v. Tutty, 41 F. 753, 7 L. R. A. 50 (C. C. S. D. Ga., 1q90)
Eggers v. Olson, 104 Okla. 297, 231 P. 483 (1924). Contra: People v.
Godines, 62 P. (2d) 787, 788 (Cal. App. 1936) ; The Inhabitants of Med-
way v. The Inhabitants of Needham, 16 Mass. 157, 8 Am. Dec. 131 (1819).
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"The statutes of Maryland peremptorily forbid the
marriage of a white person and a negro and declare
all such marriages forever void. It is, therefore, the
declared policy of this State to prohibit such marriages.
Though these marriages may be valid elsewhere, they
will be absolutely void here so long as the statutory
inhibition remains unchanged."19
The rule refusing to recognize a miscegenetic marriage,
however, might well be limited to the prevention of co-
habitation of the spouses in this state, and be relaxed to
permit the inheritance of property by the surviving spouse
or children of such a union. For this there is respectable
out-of-state authority. 0
A polygamous marriage has heretofore been regarded
as totally void in Maryland.2' And it has been said that
as common law marriages are not recognized in this state,
a marriage polygamous in its inception could not be rati-
fied by the continued cohabitation of the parties after the
death or other removal of the impediment spouse.22  Not
all states have taken the view that such a marriage is void
ab initio. Massachusetts specifically provides by statute 3
for the validation of a polygamous marriage from and after
the removal, by death or divorce, of the impediment spouse.
In West Virginia, a polygamous marriage is merely void-
able until declared void by a decree of nullity.24 Recog-
1. Jackson v. Jackson, supra, n. 12, 82 Md. 17, 30.
20 Whittington v. McCaskill, 65 Fla. 162, 61 So. 236, 44 L. R. A., N. S.,
630, Ann. Cas. 1915B, 1001 (1913).
21 Jackson v. Jackson and Jones v. Jones, supra, n. 11.
22 Jones v. Jones, supra, n. 11; and Mitchell v. Frederick, 166 Md. 42, 46,
170 A. 733, 92 A. L. R. 1412 (1934).
22 6 Anno. Laws of Massachusetts, C. 207, Sec. 6, which reads as follows:
"If a person, during the lifetime of a husband or wife with whom the mar-
riage is in force, enters into a subsequent marriage contract with due
legal ceremony and the parties thereto live together thereafter as husband
and wife, and such subsequent marriage contract was entered into by one
of the parties in good faith, in the full belief that the former husband or
wife was dead, that the former marriage had been annulled by a divorce,
or without knowledge of such former marriage, they shall, after the im-
pediment to their marriage has been removed by the death or divorce of
the other party to the former marriage, if they continue to live together
as husband and wife in good faith on the part of one of them be held to
have been legally married from and after the removal of such impediment,
and the issue of such subsequent marriage shall be considered as the
legitimate issue of both parents." For a case decided thereunder see
Hopkins v. Hopkins, 287 Mass. 542, 192 N. U. 145, 95 A. L. R. 1286 (1934)
where a marriage, invalid by the existence of a subsisting prior marriage,
was by the statute validated after the removal (by death) of the impedi-
ment spouse provided the parties continued, in good faith, to live together.
The Hopkins case is noted (1935) 21 Va. L. Rev. 331.
24 West Virginia Code (1937) Sec. 4701 which reads in part as follows:
"All marriages between a white person and a negro; all marriages which
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nition of the West Virginia statute was recently denied
by the Virginia Court in Toler v. Oakwood Smokeless Coal
Corp.5 There the plaintiff, mistakenly believing her first
husband to be dead, remarried in West Virginia, and, with
her new husband, moved to Virginia. The husband secured
employment with the defendant coal company and died
as a result of injuries arising out of such employment. The
plaintiff claimed compensation as the widow. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in finding for the defend-
ant, held that the general rule that the place of celebration
determines the validity of a marriage could not prevail
against the strong local policy as evidenced by a Virginia
statute 6 declaring such a marriage to be absolutely void.
The Virginia Court cited Jackson v. Jackson27 in support
of its view.2".
In the instant case the Maryland Court permitted a
marriage which was polygamous at its inception to be
validated through the operation of a foreign nunc pro tunc
statute which served to remove the impediment prior mar-
riage. Note also that such validating action was taken
after the attack on the second marriage had been begun.
The decision indicates a departure from the earlier rigid
void ab initio view and a readiness to apply the general
rule and refer to the foreign law. The first suggests that
the Maryland Court is moving in the direction of the view
advanced by some writers favoring the recognition of a
rule allowing an originally bigamous marriage to become
ratified by continuing to live together after death or di-
vorce removes the impediment spouse.29 The second marks
the use of the time honored approach, "valid where made-
valid everywhere", to achieve a sound result in a forum
which was the domicil of one of the spouses at the date of
suit, and which forum could find little (or no real) social
reason for condemning the marriage in question. The
are prohibited by law on account of either of the parties having a former
wife or husband then living; .. . shall be void from the time they are so
declared by decree of nullity."
21 173 Va. 425, 4 S. E. (2d) 364, 127 A. L. R. 430 (1939), noted (1940) 26
Va. L. Rev. 529.
26Virginia Code (1936) Sec. 5087 reading as follows: "All marriages
between a white person and a colored person, and all marriages which
are prohibited by law on account of either of the parties having a former
wife or husband then living, shall be absolutely void, without any decree
of divorce, or other legal process."
27 Supra, n. 12.
28 For a note on the problem as it relates to polygamous unions see Loren-
zen, Polygamy and the Conflict of Laws (1923) 32 Yale L. J. 471.
29 Myerberg, Common Law Marriage (1941) 29 Georgetown L. J. 858, 872;
and Strahorn, Void and Voidable Marriages in Maryland and Their Annul-
ment (1938) 2 Md. L. Rev. 211, 227.
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simplicity of the instant facts, and the apparent social cor-
rectness of the instant result, should not blind the reader
to the fact that the time honored phraseology under which
it was obtained is not completely descriptive of judicial
action in the field;30 nor, is it necessarily a safe guide to
a sound result in all cases.3 1 Much can be said in favor
of recognizing domicil as the controlling contact in status
cases, 2 with the rule "valid where made-valid every-
where" operating in marriage cases only because the domi-
cil on the facts of a particular case accepts that rule be-
cause it is wiser to sustain than to condemn the marriage
in question. Such has been the result of decided cases as
distinguished from the language for justifying it.33  The
Uniform Marriage Evasion Act takes the approach of re-
ferring the validity of marriage primarily to the state of
the domicil of the spouses. 4 The most recent analytical
writing in the field is critical of the "valid where made-
valid everywhere" rule (as not being an accurate guide
to either what the law is or what it should be) and suggests
that the "intended family domicil" should control the right
of the spouses to live together as husband and wife.3 5 It
may be that this problem should be controlled separately
from that of the legitimacy of issue,36 the right to inherit
property, 37 and similar problems collateral to the validity
of the marriage.
It is not the purpose of this brief note to discuss in
detail the pros and cons of the above suggested rules.
Rather it is to observe that while little fault is to be found
30 See: Whittington v. McCaskill, 65 Fla. 162, 61 So. 236, 44 L. R. A.,
N. S., 630, Ann. Cas. 1915B 1001 (1913); Hall v. Industrial Commission,
165 Wis. 364, 162 N. W. 312, L. R. A. 1917D 829 (1917) ; Meisenhelder v.
Chicago & N. W. R. Co., 170 Minn. 317, 213 N. W. 32, 51 A. L. R. 1408
(1927) ; COOK, THE LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS
(1942) Ch. XVII.
31 Ibid.
3 2 Ibid. Also, see RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934) Ch. 5; GOOD-
RICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS (2d Ed., 1938) Ch. 8. It might be observed that
on the facts of the instant case, the spouses were domiciled in California
when the marriage occurred and the wife was still there at the time of
suit although the husband bad moved to Maryland, supra, ns. 2, 4.
83 See, COOK, op. cit. supra, n. 30. The usual case involves a suit at the
domicil.
:, 9 Uniform Laws Annotated 479.
'r Supra, n. 33.
36 Ibid.
7 See, Whittington v. McCaskill, supra, n. 30. Also, for suggestion of
similar segregation of problems related to divorce see Bingham, The Amer-
ican Law Institute vs. The Supreme Court (1936) 21 Corn. L. Q. 393; and
cf. Strahorn, A Rationale of the Haddock Case (1938) 32 Ill. L. Rev. 796,
813-815; and Strahorn and Reiblich, The Haddock Case Overruled-The
Future of Interstate Divorce (1942) 7 Md. L. Rev. 29, 61, n. 95.
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with the result of the instant case it might be well to be
aware of the possible limitations of the stated rule of the
case that marriages valid where made are valid every-
where.35
DAMAGES FOR BREACH OF AUTOMOBILE
LIABILITY INSURANCE CONTRACT
Pennsylvania Threshermen and Farmers' Mutual
Casualty Insurance Company v. Messenger'
The plaintiff, a produce hauler of Salisbury, Maryland,
while operating his motor truck in Yemassee,l South Caro-
lina, struck and damaged a filling station. At the time
of the accident the vehicle was insured by a liability insur-
ance policy issued by the defendant company, insuring
the plaintiff against legal liability up to $5,000 for damage
to the property of others. The policy contained a clause
agreeing that the insurance company would defend all
suits brought against the insured on claims covered by
the policy, but they refused either to defend the attach-
ment suit brought by the owners of the damaged buildings
or to pay the judgment recovered, basing the refusal to
act on the contention that the accident had not occurred
within the 500 mile radius covered by the policy. As a
result of the failure to act the truck and trailer were sold
on execution on the judgment for much less than they
were worth.
The instant suit was instituted by the insured alleging
a loss of the damaged truck and trailer as a result of the
breach of contract by the company. The trial court found
on expert testimony that the accident was within the 500
mile radius covered by the policy and made an award of
$1,500, the value of the damaged truck and trailer as found
by the jury. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
89 For further examination of the subject of this note see Note, Foreign
Marriages in Evasion of Local Statutes (1942) 17 Tenn. L. Rev. 378;
Taintor, Effect of Extra-State Marriage Ceremonies (1938) 10 Miss. L. Rev.
105; Taintor, What Law Governs the Ceremony, Incidents and Status of
Marriage (1939) 19 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 353; Deak, Conflict of Laws:
Recent Development Concerning Marriage, supra, n. 7; and Goodrich, For-
eign Marriages and the Conflict of Laws (1923) 21 Mich. L. Rev. 743.
'29 A. (2d) 653 (Md., 1943). For a note on the companion rule of
damages for breach of alternative contract, see (1943) 7 Md. L. Rev. 160.
", The name of the town is spelled Yamassee in the opinion. The various
standard atlasses give it Yemassee.
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